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According to the def inition of  the International Association of  Terminology, "Terminology is concerned with the study and
use of  the system of  symbols and linguistic signs employed for human communication in specialised areas of  knowledge
and activities." Literary studies are such a specialised activity nowadays, and we witness in this f ield an increasing
proliferation of  technical terms which some consider to be necessary conceptual equipment, and according to others are
nothing but fussy jargon. Do these technical terms give literary studies the status of  a science, comparable to that of  the
physical or natural sciences? I will leave the question open, making only a few observations on the status of  technical
vocabulary in scientif ic theories and in philology.
The main dif ference between the status of  knowledge between human sciences like literary criticism and the "hard"
sciences would seem to be that in the former there is a continued controversy over fundamental terms and concepts at all
levels, while the latter seem to rely on more objective methods and to def ine their terms in a way which is less open to
controversy. The dif ference would then be one of  precision in methodology. Scientif ic discussions are conducted in a
more objective way, and the language of  science is more precise and referential than the language of  literary studies, which
would seem to be under the inf luence of  its object: poetry cannot be studied in a completely scientif ic way; an amount of
invention and ability as a writer is needed to study writing in an adequate way. We should beware of  any simple opposition
between the status of  the disciplines of  science and humanistic studies. Since they focus on dif ferent objects and they
provide dif ferent kinds of  knowledge, there is not much point in setting one over the other arguing that the knowledge of
science is somehow more real or def inite. Since there is no possibility of  approaching a poem as a chemist or a nuclear
physicist, it seems we should be satisf ied with the kind of  knowledge poets and critics give us in this respect.
But we cannot leave things like this, merely pointing out the dif ferences between both areas of  knowledge. Perhaps it is
more f ruitful to try and see the analogies. Since both science and literary studies try to def ine methods and a technical
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vocabulary, can we compare the role of  methodology and terminology in both?
The resemblances may turn out to be more striking than the dif ferences. Precision of  reference seems to be in both cases
an ideal which cannot explain the activity of  the critic or the scientist. Even in physical science, a technical term has a
clear, unambiguous and def inite value only insomuch as it is an instrument. This conception leaves aside the more
interesting aspect of  technical terms, which appears when their ambiguities reappear, when they cease to be well-shaped
cubes of  meaning and become fuzzy, interconnected, problematic.
H. G. Gadamer wrote to this purpose when comparing the role of  method in the human and the physical sciences. His
conclusion is that not only the human sciences, but also the physical ones, are basically hermeneutic and exploratory, that
is, that they are not ultimately based on a hypothetical scientif ic method. The real scientif ic breakthrough comes about
when new interpretive hypotheses change our outlook on the data and on the old methods. According to Gadamer, the
creative moment of  a method is to be found only at its outset, when the method is def ined. A method is like a question,
which starts f rom certain presuppositions and opens up the possibility of  a limited set of  answers. Systematic reliance on
the method will not provide radically new knowledge, but only limited answers to the limited question which is the method.
However, this limitation of  the scope of  method should not make us discard all methods as useless drudgery. There is an
interpretive moment in all use of  a method.
Any use of  a method is also an interpretation. This is easy to see if  we conceive of  interpretation as a translation f rom the
general to the particular, as a concretization and specif ic application of  a given complex of  meaning. An analogy can be
drawn f rom the f ield of  law: any law is by def inition general, it is designed to subsume an indef inite number of  practical
cases. But this means that the law does not deal with the case in its concreteness; it selects certain relevant aspects f rom
the case. Deciding on the relationship between a particular event and the law requires interpretation. It is to be noted that
the application of  the law changes the law to some extent: a def initive sentence sets a precedent which will be used as a
guide to further interpretation of  the law in future cases. It is clear that the more unforeseen the case, the greater will be
the relevance of  its interpretation. The greater the distance between the particular case and the general law, the more
creative is the interpretive act.
Let us think now of  the way technical terms are used in scientif ic discussion. A piece of  research usually works towards a
def inite aim. It is a discussion which takes place in a very def inite context, and following a well established method. The
precise meaning of  terms is ensured by the use of  a standard technical language and by the specif ic reference to previous
research on the topic. The discussion is highly technical, but all throughout there is a section which cannnot be "technical"
in this sense of  having a precise and unambiguous reference, an area in which, so to speak, method fails. This area is
precisely the subject of  the research. Method provides an orientation for the problem and a foothold in neighbouring
 PDFmyURL.com
phenomena so that we can have an instrument, a way to approach the issue. But using a method also means closing of f
certain areas f rom our interrogation. From the moment we use a term in its technical sense, we are transforming it into a
tool, and no longer the object of  our work. An instance can be Albert Einstein's account of  his research on the theory of
relativity, which was to change of  our conceptions of  space and time. The f irst thing Einstein has to do in order to
approach his subject is to discard as vague and insuf f iciently def ined the concepts of  "space" and "time". He starts his
research f rom other areas of  physics, and the result can be a new conception of  space and time. However, space and time
are problematic concepts not in se, but only with respect to a given line of  inquiry. The use of  these concepts can be
perfectly unambiguous and unproblematic if  they are used as peripheral elements in a treatise on geology, for instance.
Likewise, in physics or natural sciences, scientif ic laws and methods have a dialectical relationship with the object of
study. The end of  a method is to lead us to identify and solve a certain class of  problems; a scientif ic law also points out a
kind of  unity which underlies a set of  phenomena.
But a wholly new perspective goes beyond the application of  a method or the subsuming of  a principle under a law. A
wholly new perspective in science consists in developing a new method or discovering a new law. For instance, take the
concept of  "organic relationship" in biology. Up to the nineteenth century it was used to describe the relationships between
dif ferent tissues in the living body. However, around the middle of  the nineteenth century, the theories of  Auguste Comte,
Herbert Spencer, George Henry Lewes and others extend the notion of  organicism well beyond the limits of  biology: it is
now used to describe the relationship between the individual and his medium. This new perspective will lead to the notion
of  ecology, as well as to a rethinking of  individuality as a function of  a complex psychic and social life. According to
Lewes, mind functions in a similar way to organic life: it should not be considered as an isolated center of  organisation,
but a system of  interaction between the organism and its medium. Lewes argued that the conscious, rational part of  our
minds should not be privileged in our scientif ic conceptions, since it is only one aspect of  that mental dynamism. It is easy
to see that this theory opens the way for further inquiry into the unconscious and the social construction of  individuality
(Freud, Lacan). Scientif ic development here originates in a metaphor: the image of  the social body which goes back at
least to Menenius Agrippa. The systematic exploration of  this metaphor turned it into a literal expression, enlarging the
concept of  organicism. It would be interesting to study how this conceptual change came about, but one thing is certain: it
was due to the convergence of  many developments in social, psychological and biological theory, and not to a deliberate
and foreseeable methodological choice.
This indef inite relationship between a method and its application is also present in the f ield of  literary studies. A well-
def ined method of  literary criticism has the awesome aspect of  a compilation of  civil law--or an abstruse theological
treatise. I once heard a fellow student say of  Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Criticism: "It all sounds to me like a religion I
don't believe in." Frye is certainly a formidable theologian, with his implied circles and phases, mythoi and modes, all
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revolving around an unnamed centre. But I think my f riend approached Frye in the wrong way--seeing his work as a
practical guide for pigeonholing works of  literature into formal genres and thematic subgenres--def ining, for instance, Don
Quijote as "a degraded romance with anatomical elements, moving f rom the third phase of  romance into the fourth phase
of  irony". Certainly, if  we use Frye's model as a method for the study of  literature I think we shall be the poorer. However,
reading Anatomy of Criticism  gives anyone, I think, an unforeseen perspective on literature which is enriching even if  we do
not fully share it. I think the technical terms used here by Frye are useful in giving form to his view of  literature, but what is
illuminating is the vision of  the literary f ield conveyed by the work as a whole. Some of  the more famous coiners of  critical
jargon, such as Frye, or Genette in his Narrative Discourse, do not conceive their theory-making as a blueprint for further
research, but as the research itself , inseparable f rom the perspective provided on specif ic works.
Critical jargon is not completely new in literary studies. Classical rhetorical analysis, as developed f rom the Sophists
through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance into the eighteenth century, resulted in the proliferation of  technicalities
def ined with ever more microscopic precision; the inventories of  tropes and f igures must contain thousands of  items,
among which we could include some far-fetched ones like . We cannot say, however, that this methodical analysis of
discourse ever approached a more adequate knowledge of  its object while it delved in this pre-established direction. Plato
already complained of  the proliferation of  technical rhetorical terms in Phaedrus. His own approach to the study of
discourses is a dif ferent one: not f rom the point of  view of  formal rhetoric, but f rom the point of  view of  moral philosophy.
A new intention brings along a new method, and with a new purpose of  his own in mind, Plato can discard as useless
machinery the rhetorical analysis of  the Sophists. We see that adequacy is def ined by the aims of  literary study at a given
time. Rhetorical analysis opens up a horizon of  inquiry on the nature of  a discourse which must seem narrow when
compared with the Platonic one.
In the same way, a formalist approach of  our own century like structuralist narratology will seem narrow and mechanical
when it is used as a mere device for categorizing and classifying a series of  phenomena which are already pre-def ined by
the theory. The danger is even greater if  the def initions are assumed to be f inal. Can we ever def ine with precision what is
an 'external focalizer', or an 'homodiegetic narrator'? I do not think this is the case: when the moment of  application
comes, we shall see that our def initions are always insuf f icient--except in the most uninteresting cases. Even if  we wished
to construct all-inclusive tables which specif ied all the problematic cases we f ind as we go along, we would not have
solved the question of  method. A method is a starting point, a question which opens up a discussion. But the question
cannot be the f inal answer. Probably, in the case of  narratological analysis, our best insights will come when we combine
the method with a line of  inquiry deriving f rom another discipline--say, psychoanalysis or deconstruction, a conjunction
which illuminates the work in a way no pre-established method can. Our encounter with the work should be unique, a
private scientif ic revolution of  our own.
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The use of  a method and a precise terminology can teach us to order and develop our perception, to see better; but the
method stops short of  the truly interpretive moment. According to T. S. Kuhn, "In the metaphorical no less than in the literal
use of  'seeing,' interpretation begins where perception ends. The two processes are not the same, and what perception
leaves for interpretation to complete depends drastically on the nature and amount of  prior experience and training." A
method can teach us to perceive things which escape the perception of  those who lack a method. It cannot give us the
clue for interpretation, since the act of  interpretation involves an interaction between the original complex of  meaning and
the context of  the interpreter, including the specif ic aim of  the research. Interpretation involves a perception of  practical
needs in the interpreter's intellectual context. It is the interpreter's task to f ind in which way a work or a methodological
approach can become relevant and signif icant for us here and now. I have said both a work and a method, since both
should be objects of  interpretation, and help illuminate each other through the critic's activity.
I would conclude therefore that technical terms in literary studies share in the general nature of  methodology: they will not
on the whole contribute to clarify our understanding of  literature; rather, they will make it more complex. This is not a
defect of  the technical approaches, but rather the condition set by the context in which they are used: the increasing
specialization and professionalization of  literary studies and the broadening horizons of  cultural production. The aim of
the literary scholar should be to preserve the unity of  culture once its variety is acknowledged--to show how in spite of  the
complexities of  modern cultural production, of  postmodernist literature and post-structuralist critical theory, understanding
is not impossible: that the literary tradition can still be looked at with new eyes, that dif ferent perspectives on reality can
still translate into each other, that dif ferent codes can be used to make sense of  an object--which is af ter all the semiotic
def inition of  meaning. Another way to put it is that the aim of  philology as a science is to preserve the possibility of
communication within dif ferent cultural productions. In this context, terms and concepts cannot remain static, precise and
unambiguous forever: instead, we must learn to set them in motion and make them speak through each other.
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(Comunicación presentada en el seminario Susanne Hübner,"Terminología de Uso Común en las Ciencias del Lenguaje,
Crítica Literaria y Estudios Socio-Culturales", organizado por el Departamento de f ilología Inglesa y Alemana de la
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